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Abstract 
Recent innovations in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) provide new opportunities and challenges 
for integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the 
energy supply system as active market players. By increasing 
integration of DERs, novel market platform should be designed 
for these new market players. The designed electricity market 
should maximize market surplus for consumers and suppliers 
and provide correct incentives for them to join the market and 
follow market rules. In this paper, a feeder-based market is 
proposed for local energy trading among prosumers and 
consumers in the distribution system. In this market, market 
players are allowed to share energy with other players in the 
local market and with neighborhood areas. A Two-Step Market 
Clearing (2SMC) mechanism is proposed for market clearing, 
in which in the first step, each local market is cleared 
independently to determine the market clearing price and in the 
second step, players can trade energy with neighborhood areas. 
In comparison to a centralized market, the proposed method is 
scalable and reduces computation overheads, because instead 
of clearing market for a large number of players, the market is 
cleared for a fewer number of players. Also, by applying 
distributed method and Lagrangian multipliers for market 
clearing, there is no need for a central computation centre and 
private information of market players. Case studies 
demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed 
market clearing method in increasing social welfare and 
reducing computation time. 
1 Introduction 
The recent developments of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) and smart systems has motivated 
consumers to become more active players instead of being 
submissive ratepayers. These new active players participate in 
the market as prosumers by using their local resources, 
managing their demand, and communicating with other 
players. Using the two-way flow of information and energy, 
these new players can exchange both information and energy 
among themselves and with the grid. In the distribution grid, 
prosumers can trade energy with other prosumers and 
consumers by buying energy from them when they need more 
energy or selling to them when they have surplus energy. 
This energy trading incentivizes consumers and prosumers to 
participate more actively in the market. As the number of 
prosumers with Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) 
increases in the distribution grid, the reliance on the 
conventional main electric grid is reduced by providing local 
generation instead of produced energy in centralized and large 
energy plants. The local generation of DERs provides 
opportunities for energy trading in an open and flexible market. 
This new context of an open and flexible market for DER 
owners has triggered considerable attention to local energy 
trading. In the traditional markets, energy trading is performed 
for large-scale generations and on the transmission side. 
However, in the local energy market, energy trading occurs 
between a lot of small-scale DERs. Therefore, applying 
traditional markets to the local energy market is not 
straightforward and new mechanisms for small-scale trading 
and local energy markets are needed. In the local energy 
markets, energy system is restructured in a way that enables 
prosumers and consumers to join the energy supply system [1]. 
A local market is defined based on micro market concept in a 
residential area or similar for energy trading between people 
located in the same neighbourhood with the possibility of 
trading between neighbourhood areas [2].  
 
The design of a market for incentivizing local energy trading 
between small-scale prosumers and consumers has been 
investigated in several research. A market design is proposed 
in [3] to encourage market players to form groups of sellers and 
buyers for energy trading. The concept of local energy trading 
between a set of energy storage units has been proposed in [4], 
where authors propose an auction-based approach for energy 
trading among storages and consumers. A localized retail 
energy market is proposed in [5], where an energy broker acts 
as middleman to match sellers and buyers based on search 
theory. Authors in [6], propose an auction-based market 
clearing for local energy trading, where knapsack algorithm is 
applied for market clearing in P2P energy trading. As more 
prosumers are integrated into power systems, the centralized 
methods are not suitable for such heterogeneous systems with 
large number of players [7] and the scalability and required 
computation infrastructure would be challenging for any new 
market design. 
 
In the recent years, there is a tendency for using distributed 
methods for market design. In these methods, decision making 
can be distributed across many decision makers which make 
these methods scalable and reduce computation overheads by 
eliminating the need for a central computation centre. 
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Distributed methods need a coordination signal among market 
players to reach the global optimum, where electricity price or 
power mismatch can be used as coordination signal. Market 
design based on distributed methods has gained high attention 
in the recent literature. Authors in [8] propose a community 
based electricity market structure which allows prosumers to 
actively optimize their assets using distributed optimization A 
distributed consensus-based algorithm for energy trading is 
proposed in [9], where local estimation of power mismatch is 
used as coordination signal to reach consensus. Business 
models for P2P energy trading in distributed energy trading has 
been proposed in [10], which shows that local energy trading 
is preferred solution for a system with large number of small-
scale DERs. Energy trading among microgrids is investigated 
in [11] using a distributed solution to minimize social cost of 
the system. This paper designs a bargaining based energy 
trading to encourage local energy trading.  
 
In the most of the previous works on distributed energy trading, 
the focus is on determining the total amount of traded energy 
to satisfy the overall system demand without paying attention 
to the computational overheads. However, when the number of 
market players is high, computational cost and convergence 
rate become critical factors in the market design and 
implementation. In this paper, a feeder-based market topology 
for local energy trading is proposed, where the total grid is 
divided into several local markets with a limited number of 
players.  In each local market, prosumers and consumers can 
trade energy to maximize their social welfare. The advantage 
of the proposed market is that it can be implemented for any 
number of players by forming any number of local markets that 
can be cleared locally without any need to individual and 
private information of players. In other word, instead of 
clearing the market for a large number of players it can be 
easily performed for a local market with a limited number of 
players. It makes the system easier to manage and operate and 
reduces the burden of communication and computation in the 
system. Also, a Two-Step Market Clearing (2SMC) approach 
is presented for market clearing which has the following 
features: 
 
- There is no need to individual information of market 
players for market clearing. In addition, it is not required to 
have a communication channel between consumers and 
prosumers to exchange information with all players. 
- Each player can decide on his action in the market by 
responding to the coordination signal (price signal) 
- Players have the opportunity to trade with neighborhood 
area to increase their welfare. 
- The proposed approach can be implemented for a large 
number of players. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 gives 
details of assumption for feeder-based market design and 
formulation for optimization problem. The 2SMC has been 
explained in Section 3. Numerical analysis and case studies are 
provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the paper 
and discusses future works. 
2 Feeder-based market   
2.1 Assumptions 
This section provides an overview of the feeder-based energy 
trading in the distribution network. In this paper, the market 
structure is designed to incentivize market players for local 
energy trading. The total distribution system is divided to 
several local market and prosumures and consumers connected 
to the same feeder can trade energy locally, where players with 
excess energy try to sell this energy and players who need 
energy try to buy it from local market for a lower price. Market 
players participate in the market by responding to the 
electricity price and adjusting their load/generation. In each 
area, there is a data centre which receives information from 
players of that area to clear the market and acts as coordinator. 
Figure. 1 illustrates schematic of a feeder-based market with 
three areas including sellers, buyers and data centres. 
2.2 Problem formulation 
The objective of the local market is to maximize social welfare 
of all market players. Social welfare maximization not only can 
maximize the total welfare of all market players, but also can 
guarantee that each individual welfare is maximized [12]. The 
number of total areas is specified by ℒ and 𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆and 𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵 indicate 
the number of sellers (prosumers) and buyers (consumers) in 
area ℓ respectively. The utility function of consumers and cost 
function of prosumers are defined in this section. The utility 
function of each consumer is a unique function based on 
 
Figure 1: The schematic of feeder-based market for local 
energy trading 
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parameters  𝜔𝜔 and 𝜇𝜇. The utility function for 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎconsumer in 
area ℓ can be modelled by (1) [13]. 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗 �= �𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 − 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 �2           𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 < 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 2𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗⁄  (𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗)2 4𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗⁄                     𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 ≥ 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗 2𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗⁄   (1) 
where 𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗 is demanded energy by 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎconsumer from the market. 
The welfare in buyer side can be measured with the consumer`s 
surplus which is presented by (2): 
 
𝒲𝒲ℬ𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗 �= 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 �− 𝜆𝜆𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗   (2) 
where 𝜆𝜆 is the paid money by consumer for each kWh of 
energy. The total cost of output power of prosumers can be 
estimated by a quadratic cost function with parameters 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏 and 
𝛾𝛾 which customize cost function for each prosumer [14]. 
  
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 )2 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  (3) 
The welfare of prosumer is the gained benefit by prosumer in 
the market and can be presented by (4). 
 
𝒲𝒲𝒲𝒲𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 ) (4) 
where, 𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 is the supplied energy by prosumer i to the market. 
In each area, prosumers and consumers can trade energy with 
other players in that area (intra-area) and neighbourhood areas 
(inter-area). Therefore, the demanded/supplied energy by each 
consumer/prosumer can be represented by (5) and (6). 
 
𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗 = 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗  + 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗  (5) 
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖  (6) 
where, 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α 𝑗𝑗  and 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗  are demanded energy by consumer 𝑗𝑗 in 
area ℓ from intra-area and inter-area markets respectively, 
whereas 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖  and 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖  are the supplied energy by prosumer 𝑖𝑖 in 
area ℓ to these markets respectively. The social welfare in each 
area is the summation of utility of all consumers minus cost of 
all prosumers. Therefore, the objective function for all players 
in the market can be written as (7).  
 max∑ �∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 � − ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 )𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �ℒℓ=1   (7) 
Since the demand and supply in the system should be balanced, 
the problem in (7) is constrained by (8). Also, each player has 
its own limitation for generation or load as (9) and (10). 
 
∑ ∑ �𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 �𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1ℒℓ=1 = ∑ ∑ �𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 �𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1ℒℓ=1   (8) 
𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (9) 
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (10) 
The optimization problem in (1), can be easily solved using 
different methods such as interior point method or bundle 
methods. However, this optimization needs individual 
information of all players. Also, a central computation centre 
is required to collect information of all players and find energy 
allocation and price for all of them. With the increase in the 
number of market players, the required computation facilities 
and communication signals for the market clearing would a 
barrier for new market design. Therefore, in this paper, a 
distributed method is applied for market clearing, which can be 
implemented without any need to central computation centre 
for all players. In this approach, the total problem is 
decomposed to several sub-problems for each area, and each 
sub-problem is also decomposed to several local problems 
which are locally solvable by each player. 
3 Two-step market clearing approach 
In this paper, distributed market clearing approach utilizing the 
primal-dual gradient descent method is used for market 
clearing [15]. In this approach, the objective function is 
augmented with Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) multipliers and 
after that, a distributed iterative approach is developed that 
moves in the direction of maximizing the augmented objective 
function [16, 17]. Here, the KKT multipliers are coordination 
signals which should be updated iteratively till are players 
reach consensus on their actions in the market. The Lagrangian 
function to solve (7) subject to (8) can be defined as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿�𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 ,𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 ,𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 ,𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗  � = 
∑ �∑ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ
𝑗𝑗 �− ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 )𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �ℒℓ=1   +𝜆𝜆ℓ �∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1ℒℓ=1 −∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1ℒℓ=1 �  +𝜆𝜆∁ �∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1ℒℓ=1 −∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,E𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1ℒℓ=1 �  
(11) 
where, 𝜆𝜆ℓ and 𝜆𝜆∁ are KKT multipliers. The next step is to 
develop the distributed iterative approach based on dual 
decomposition. In this market, each prosumer/consumer can 
sell/buy energy to/from local market or neighborhood markets. 
Market clearing is designed to be performed in two step. At the 
first step, players can trade energy intra-area with other players 
with a unique clearing price for each area (𝜆𝜆ℓ). In the second 
step, players can trade energy with neighborhood areas, where 
prosumers of an area with lower price can sell their energy to 
the consumers of an area with higher price. This two-step 
market clearing allows market players to decide on their action 
in the market by adjusting their load/generation in response to 
the clearing price. Also, it gives them opportunity to increase 
their welfare through trading with neighbourhood areas. 
Therefore, the iterative approach for market clearing should be 
developed to clear the market in two step. At the first step, 
prosumers and consumers in each area send their demand and 
supply to the local data centre. The electricity price in each area 
is calculated based on all demands and supplies using (12). 
 
𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1) = 𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘) + ƞℓ �∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1 −∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �  (12) 
where ƞℓ is tuning parameter which indicates convergence rate 
of demand and supply and 𝜆𝜆ℓ is clearing price for intra-area trading.  
Then, this price is sent to the players and they will update their 
demand and supply based on this price by (13) and (14) 
respectively. 
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𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 = max
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 ≤𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 �𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1)� − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 �� (13) 
𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 = max
𝑑𝑑
ℓ
𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑑𝑑
ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 ≤𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗 ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈
𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 �− 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 �𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1)�� (14) 
This algorithm repeats till demand and supply are converged. 
In the second step of market clearing, a new area (indicated by 
∁ ) is formed by prosumers of the area with lower price and consumers 
of the area with higher price and the described procedure for the first 
step will repeat for the market clearing in the new area using (15-17). 
 
𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1) = 𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘) + ƞ∁ �∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁∁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁∁𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �  (15) 
𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 = max
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 +𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 ≤𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 �𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1)� − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 �� (16) 
𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 = max
𝑑𝑑
ℓ
𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑑𝑑
ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 +𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 ≤𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈
𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 �
− 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 �𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘 + 1)�� (17) 
where, ƞ∁ is tuning parameter for the second step and 𝜆𝜆∁ is 
clearing price for inter-area trading . In the second step, a new 
market clearing price in calculated using (15) and sellers and 
buyers respond to this price by managing their generation and 
load using (16) and (17) respectively. Market clearing 
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, 𝜆𝜆ℓ and 
𝜆𝜆∁ are actually Lagrangian multiplier related to demand-supply 
constraint which act as coordination signals for distributed 
market clearing. These prices are calculated in data centres and 
any calculation for updating demand and supply is performed 
in market players’ smart meters.  
4 Case studies 
The proposed 2SMC is implemented in a simple market with 
20 players (9 prosumers and 11 consumers) which are 
dispatched in three areas. In each area, there are a different 
number of prosumers and consumers that try to maximize their 
welfare by adjusting their generation/load in response to the 
market price. Table 1 shows the parameters of the cost function 
and utility function of consumers and prosumers [18]. The 
initial value of 𝜆𝜆ℓ and 𝜆𝜆∁ are set to zero. Also, the minimum demand 
and supply for all players are selected to be zero. The evolution of 
the electricity price in step 1 for different areas is shown in 
Figure.2. This figure illustrates that the clearing price in area 2 
(𝜆𝜆2) is higher than the price in area 1 (𝜆𝜆1) and 3 (𝜆𝜆3). Therefore, 
consumers of area 2 and prosumers of area 1 and 3 participate 
in the step 2 clearing. Market clearing price for step 2 (𝜆𝜆∁) is 
also shown in Figure 2 which is higher than 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆3 and 
lower than 𝜆𝜆2. 
 
The proposed method is compared with one-step market 
clearing (1SMC) method, where there is only one market 
clearing price for all market players. In this case, players of 
different areas participate in the one market and market 
clearing is performed in one step. Market clearing price for 
1SMC is shown in Figure 1 as 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇. Figure 3 shows the social 
welfare of market players and traded energy for 1SMC and 
2SMC. These results reveal that by applying the proposed 
2SMC, total traded energy and social welfare of market players 
are increased, which means that in the proposed market 
clearing, players gain more welfare in the market. 
 
In order to analyze performance of the proposed algorithm for 
a large scale system, it has been applied to a system with 2000 
players, including 900 prosumers and 1100 consumers. For this 
system, the computational time and social welfare of the 
proposed 2SMC are compared with the 1SMC and results are 
shown in Table 2. In 2SMC, the computational time is obtained 
by adding the highest time in the first step and the required time 
in the second step. 
 
Prosumers` parameters Consumers` parameters 
𝒊𝒊 𝒂𝒂𝒊𝒊 𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊 𝓵𝓵 𝒔𝒔𝓵𝓵
𝒊𝒊,𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒎 𝒋𝒋 𝝎𝝎𝒋𝒋  𝝁𝝁𝒋𝒋  𝓵𝓵 𝒅𝒅𝓵𝓵𝒋𝒋,𝒎𝒎𝒂𝒂𝒎𝒎 
1 0.0031 8.71 1 113.23 1 17.17 0.0935 1 91.79 
2 0.0074 3.53 1 179.1 2 12.28 0.0417 1 147.29 
3 0.0066 7.58 1 90.03 3 18.42 0.1007 1 91.41 
4 0.0063 2.24 2 106.41 4 7.06 0.0561 1 62.96 
5 0.0069 8.53 2 193.80 5 10.85 0.0540 2 100.53 
6 0.0014 2.25 3 37.19 6 18.91 0.1414 2 66.88 
7 0.0041 6.29 3 195.4 7 18.76 0.0793 2 118.35 
8 0.0051 4.30 3 62.17 8 15.70 0.1064 2 73.81 
9 0.0032 8.26 3 143.41 9 14.28 0.0580 2 84.00 
     10 10.15 0.0460 3 110.32 
     11 19.04 0.0650 3 146.46 
Table 1: Utility and cost function parameters of prosumers 
and consumers 
 
Algorithm 1: Market clearing algorithm 
Initialization: Set 𝜆𝜆ℓ(0), 𝜖𝜖ℓ  and ƞℓ 
Step 1 (Intra-Area clearing) 
1: Repeat till |𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘 + 1) − 𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘)| ≤ 𝜖𝜖ℓ  
2: Update 𝜆𝜆ℓ according to  
𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1) = 𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘) + ƞℓ �∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁ℓ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1 −∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁ℓ𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �  
3: Send 𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1) to the players in the area 
4: Sellers update their supply according to 
𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 = max
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 ≤𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 �𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1)� − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 �� 
5: Buyers update their demand according to 
𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 = max
𝑑𝑑
ℓ
𝑗𝑗 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑑𝑑
ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 ≤𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈
𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 �− 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 �𝜆𝜆ℓ(𝑘𝑘+ 1)�� 
Step 2 (Inter-Area clearing) 
1: Communicate with neighborhood areas 
2: Set area ∁ with sellers of area with lower price and buyers 
of area with higher price 
3: Set 𝜆𝜆∁(0), 𝜖𝜖∁  and ƞ∁  
4: Repeat till |𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘 + 1) − 𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘)| ≤ 𝜖𝜖∁  
5: Update 𝜆𝜆∁ according to  
𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1) = 𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘) + ƞ∁ �∑ 𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁∁𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 (𝑘𝑘)𝑁𝑁∁𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗=1 �  
6: Send 𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1) to the players in the area 
7: Sellers update their supply according to 
𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 = max
𝑠𝑠ℓ
𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑠𝑠ℓ,Α𝑖𝑖 +𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 ≤𝑠𝑠ℓ𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 �𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1)� − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠ℓ,Ε𝑖𝑖 �� 
8: Buyers update their demand according to 
𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 = max
𝑑𝑑
ℓ
𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚≤𝑑𝑑
ℓ,Α𝑗𝑗 +𝑑𝑑ℓ ,Ε𝑗𝑗 ≤𝑑𝑑ℓ𝑗𝑗,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈
𝑗𝑗�𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 �− 𝑑𝑑ℓ,Ε𝑗𝑗 �𝜆𝜆∁(𝑘𝑘+ 1)�� 
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These results show that for a large scale system, the proposed 
method can increase the social welfare by 20% and reduce the 
required computational time by 48%, which validates the 
efficacy of the proposed method in the large-scale systems. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper proposes a feeder-based market topology for local 
energy trading among prosumers and consumers. In the feeder-
based markets, the total grid is divided into several local 
markets with limited number of players and in each local 
market, prosumers and consumers can trade energy to 
maximize their social welfare. The advantage of the proposed 
market is that it can be implemented for any number of players 
by forming any number of local markets that can be cleared 
locally without any need to individual and private information 
of players. Then a new approach for market clearing in feeder 
based market is proposed, where a 2SMC mechanism is 
designed to clear the market for local energy trading. This 
approach can be performed without any need to central 
computation centre and individual information of players. 
Simulation results verified that the proposed 2SMC increases 
total traded energy and welfare of market players. Also, this 
method reduces the computational time and can be 
implemented for any large-scale system. For the future works, 
the networks constraints (especially line flow constraint) will 
be added for trading among neighbouring areas to consider 
network topology in the market clearing. Also, other market 
players such as retailers and utility companies will be modelled 
in the market. 
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